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ENVIRONMENTAL GOOD PRODUCTION  
IN THE OPTIMUM ACTIVITIES PORTFOLIO  
OF A RISK AVERSE FARMER  
Abstract 
An analytical framework is proposed for analysis of environmental good production by farmers in the 
case of price uncertainty. Environmental good production contracted by means of agri-environmental 
agreements  is  treated  as  a  riskless  option  in  the  farmer's  production  activities  portfolio.  Efficient 
frontiers were generated using mathematical programming farm level models of suckler cow farms in 
Monts du Cantal, in France. It was demonstrated that for a DARA risk averse farmer: 1) the agreement 
payment level is not without impact on the farming intensity on parcels not subscribed under the 
corresponding  agri-environmental  programme,  2)  a  lump  sum  payment  matters  under  uncertainty, 
3) the overall impact of the lump sum payment on environmental good production depends on the type 
of jointness in production of agricultural and environmental goods, and on the level of uncertainty.  
Keywords:  uncertainty,  portfolio  optimisation,  biodiversity,  agricultural  policy,  mathematical 
programming  
JEL: Q12, Q18, Q28  
1. Introduction 
The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  reform  of  June  2003  follows  the  trend  of  decoupling 
agricultural  subsidies  from  production  activities  with  the  aim  to  fulfil  the  WTO  commitments 
requiring application of less trade distorting agricultural policy instruments. Progressive reduction of 
the price support and of coupled subsidies, which accompanies this reform, is likely to increase the 
price  volatility  of  agricultural  outputs.  As  Hennessy  (1998)  demonstrated,  under  uncertainty  even 
decoupled subsidies influence behaviour of a risk averse farmer. Thus it seems meaningful to apply 
models which enable to account for uncertainty and for farmers  risk aversion if analysing agricultural 
policies. In this paper, we propose such a framework for analysis of environmental good production by 
farmers when contracted by means of agri-environmental agreements. 
Uncertainty  is  an  important  issue  concerning  the  joint  production  of  agricultural  and 
environmental goods. Vermersch (2001) considers uncertainty as a special source of jointness. Hanley 
and Oglethorpe (1999) support indirectly this concept when they state that the guaranteed nature of 
agri-environmental payments offered to UK farmers represented for them an important incentive to 
adopt  these  agreements  as  a  risk-reducing  management  tool .  In  our  paper  we  do  not  consider 
uncertainty as an independent source of jointness. We investigate rather how the volatility of output 
prices changes the willingness of farmers to comply with agri-environmental agreements if one or 
another of the main sources of jointness as defined by OECD (2001) is present: non-allocable inputs 
(complementary production) and allocable fixed inputs (competing production). 
The joint production of agricultural commodities, beef, and an environmental good, grassland 
biodiversity, is investigated here. The quantity of biodiversity  produced depends on the grassland 
management intensity. Usually some special level of farming activity is required and the quantity of 
biodiversity produced falls both if this level is not attained or if it is exceeded. For example Balent et 
al. (1998) found that in Pyrenees the species richness of pastures slightly increases when the dry mass 
consumption increases from 0.5 tonnes/ha/year to something more than 1 tonne/ha/year but above this 
value it starts to fall. The optimal level of beef production is not unique for all biotopes. Thus some 
fragile  biotopes  require  only  very  low  levels  of  beef  production  and  the  beef  and  biodiversity  is 
generally competing in such zones. The competition is caused by the presence of an allocable fixed 
input: the grassland. It can be considered as allocable as it should be partially or completely diverted 
from beef production in order to secure biodiversity production. On the other hand, there are zones 
where  biodiversity  is  permanently  jeopardised  by  invasive  species  and  it  would  be  lost  without 
sufficiently  high  management  intensity.  There  the  beef  and  biodiversity  production  are  generally 
complementary. The source of complementarity is the presence of a non-allocable input: the cattle 
herd. An increase in the number of livestock units enables to produce at the same time more beef and 






precisely  for  this  opportunity  to  analyse  both  complementary  and  competing  agricultural  and 
environmental good production.    
We propose to analyse the environmental good production under uncertainty in the expected 
value 
 
variance framework elaborated by Markowitz (1952). If a farmer has the possibility to produce 
several outputs, he will not only adjust the overall supply but also its structure in the search for an 
efficient portfolio of activities. We consider the application of the separation theorem described by 
Tobin (1958) in the financial theory framework. Tobin demonstrated that if both risky and riskless 
assets are available, the optimisation proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the optimum portfolio of risky 
assets  is  assembled,  whose  composition  does  not  depend  on  the  risk  aversion  of  the  investor. 
Secondly, the investor decides depending on his risk aversion which share of his money should be 
invested  in  the  risky  portfolio  and  which  share  should  be  held  in  the  riskless  asset.  The  Tobin s 
separation theorem was applied to analyse the farm diversification problem by Johnson (1967) who 
considered as a riskless option the land leasing in or out. He concluded that a strongly risk averse 
farmer will tend to lease out a share of his land in order to ensure a higher stability of returns, a risk 
neutral farmer will rather tend to lease in some additional land in order to increase his returns even if 
this will increase the volatility of the expected profit. Roche and McQuinn (2004) applied the same 
separation theorem to the analysis of the European Union s CAP reform of the June 2003. They found 
that a complete decoupling of agricultural subsidies will encourage farmers who choose to produce, to 
introduce in their portfolio of activities riskier products than before the reform.  
Our  model  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  agricultural  commodities  (different  types  of 
animals sold at various ages, fattened or lean, etc.) represent risky activities due to stochastic output 
prices - the unique source of uncertainty in the model. Environmental good production remunerated by 
means of agri-environmental agreements is considered as a riskless activity. This is justified by the 
fact that agri-environmental agreements propose a guaranteed annual payment to the farmer during 
several years (5, 10 or 20) in exchange for his compliance with instructions involved in the contract. 
These instructions include some restrictions on the farming activity and/or they demand additional 
tasks to be carried out. The farmer is remunerated for compliance with the instructions and not for the 
result of his compliance.  Thus not only  the amount of the payment is guaranteed  but the farmer 
controls entirely also the respect of conditions implying the attribution of the payment for particular 
year.  Applying  Tobin s  separation  theorem,  the  impact  of  the  possibility  to  subscribe  an  agri-
environmental agreement on the shape of farmers  portfolio efficient frontiers can be assessed.  
The  model  is  tested  by  implementing  a  mathematical  programming  farm  level  model  of  a 
representative suckler cow farm in the Monts du Cantal, France. In this region, zones representing 
both  complementary  and  competing  beef  and  biodiversity  production  can  be  found  in  formally 
designated  Environmentally  Sensitive  Areas  (ESAs),  where  agri-environmental  agreements  were 
proposed to farmers in order to enhance the biodiversity production. A simplified version of these 
agreements from two selected ESAs is incorporated into the programming model in order to asses the 
validity  of  the  theoretical  framework  and  to  derive  comparative  statics  concerning  the  impact  of 
decoupled subsidies and output price variability on the biodiversity production.   
2. Analytical framework: Portfolio optimisation 
The general framework is presented graphically here. We suppose that the farmer maximises a utility 




is the expected profit and V( )
 
the standard deviation of profit. 
The E, V space contains two basic elements: the efficient frontier of risky assets and a set of farmer s 
indifference curves. All through the text we make the assumption that the farmers exhibit decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA). DARA preference assumption is well supported by empirical studies 
carried out by Lins et al. (1981), Saha et al. (1994) or Chavas and Pope (1996). For DARA farmers, 
the marginal rate of substitution between the expected profit and its standard deviation decreases with 
expected  utility  of  profit. The  indifference  map  can  be  plotted  as  in  Figure  1.  We  make  another 
common assumption that the efficient frontier is concave. When no riskless activity exists, a utility 
maximising  farmer  will  choose  to  produce  the  output  bundle R,  the  tangency  point  between  the 
efficient frontier and an indifference curve.  
Agri-environmental agreements concerning biodiversity production demand from the farmer a 
decrease  of  the  farming  intensity  if  biodiversity  production  is  competing  for  resources  with  beef 
production.  An  illustrative  example  are  the  environmental  set  asides  where  the  farmer  receives  a 






risky income from agricultural commodities production for a guaranteed income from environmental 
good production.  
If the possibility to divert a share of the land from beef to biodiversity production for a transfer 
payment t is introduced, the farmer can gain the sum T corresponding to the total number of hectares 
he possesses multiplied by the agreement payment t and reduced by fixed cost in the short run, without 
facing  any  risk.  T  is  for  him  a  certainty  equivalent.  We  can  draw  a  line  representing  linear 
combinations of the certainty equivalent and the risky activities bundle, corresponding to the market 
opportunity line in the finance theory. This line starts from the point T, and a utility maximising 
farmer will construct it so that it is tangent to the efficient frontier of risky activities, in our case the 
line TBA. Thus the optimisation  really  proceeds in  two  stages: firstly, the farmer  determines the 
optimal risky output bundle, here A, as the tangency point between the market opportunity line and the 
efficient set of risky activities, and then the share of the land to be committed to the agreement, 
|AB|/|AT|, where B is the tangency point between the new efficient frontier and an indifference curve. 
The  new  efficient  frontier  accounting  for  the  agri-environmental  agreement  is  composed  of  two 
segments: the linear segment TA and the concave one corresponding to the original efficient frontier 
to the right of the point A. 
This scheme enables us to discuss directly the impacts of a change in the agri-environmental 
payment t. If the agreement payment is increased from t to t , the certainty equivalent increases from T 
to T . The slope of the market opportunity line decreases and it s tangent point with the indifference 
curve, D, corresponds to lower variability in comparison to the point B. On the other hand, the tangent 
point of the market opportunity line with the efficiency frontier, C, moves rightwards. Thus the share 
of land diverted from beef to biodiversity production unambiguously increases (|CD|/|CT |>|AB|/|AT|). 
The profit variability of the bundle of risky activities indicated by the point C is higher than it was at 
the point A. If higher intensity implies higher uncertainty about the profits from risky agricultural 
activities, the land not committed to the agreement will be managed more intensively than before the 
increase in t. Thus risk aversion can partially explain the perverse effects of some environmental 
agreements which aiming on the extensification on one field induce undesirable intensification on 
others.    
Figure 1. Tobin s separation theorem and the competing beef and biodiversity production.  
The same framework can be applied for the case where beef and biodiversity production are 
complementary. Often the most valuable grasslands from the biodiversity point of view are being 
abandoned because their management is not profitable. The re-utilisation induces some costs due to 
the necessary shrub cleaning, renewal of the grassland or shrub prevention and some benefits in the 
form of supplementary forage. The agri-environmental payment serves to cover only partially the 
costs, the rest still has to be covered by the stochastic benefits from agricultural production.  
The  complementary  beef  and  biodiversity  production  is  depicted  in  the  Figure  2.  As  in  the 
scheme above, the optimum portfolio of activities if no agri-environmental agreements are proposed 
corresponds to  the point R. But even  without agreements the  farmer  can  re-utilise his  previously 























can draw a line which is tangent to the concave efficiency set at the point R. The point QR represents 
the sum of hectares initially cultivated multiplied by the unit cost of regaining additional grassland 
reduced by the fixed cost. It resembles to the certainty equivalent point T in Figure 1 but it is not. 
Because while it is possible to re-gain the grassland for some unit cost, it is not supposed that the 
farmer  has  the  opportunity  to  lease  his  land  out  for  the  same  cost.  Thus  if  the  farmer  has  some 
degraded grassland which can be re-utilised for a constant unit cost, the efficient frontier is concave 
until  the  point  R  and  it  is  linear  to  the  right  of  this  point.  The  market  opportunity  line
1  without 
agreements must go through the point R because we suppose that the farmer already re-gained the 
grassland he needed and the cost of regaining any supplementary grassland would not be covered by 
the stochastic returns. 
If an agreement payment t is proposed to the farmer for cleaning supplementary grassland, the 
perceived unit cost of re-utilisation falls so that the new market line emanates from the point Q whose 
value  is  by  T  lower  than  the  value  of  QR.  (T  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  initially  utilised  grassland 
multiplied by the agreement payment t. It has little practical meaning.) A farmer with the preference 
structure depicted in the picture would regain the grassland corresponding to the share |AB|/|AQ| of the 
grassland initially at hand |AQ|. Increasing the agreement payment t to t
 
makes the perceived cost to 
fall even more, the new intercept of the market opportunity line with the y-axis is at the point Q . As 
expected, the quantity of regained grassland increases after an increase in the agreement payment 
(|CD|/|CQ |>|AB|/|AQ|).  This  increase  is  unambiguous  for  a  concave  efficiency  locus  and  DARA 
preferences.   
Figure 2. Tobin s separation theorem and the complementary beef and biodiversity production  
The profit variability corresponding to the risky activities bundle characterised by point C is 
lower than at the initial point A. This implies that in cases, where an agri-environmental payment 
aiming at biodiversity production competing with beef production enhances the farming intensity on 
the parcels not subscribed under it, an agri-environmental payment aiming at biodiversity production 
complementary to beef production will lead to a fall of the farming intensity on parcels utilised before 
the agreement subscription.   
                                                
 
1  The line creating the linear segment will be called the market opportunity line also here in order to save a 




























3. An illustrative application 
How this concept can be applied in practice is demonstrated on a case study of beef and biodiversity 
production by suckler cow farms in Monts du Cantal, Massif Central (France). The Monts du Cantal is 
a humid volcanic region with an altitude reaching from 900 to 1300 meters where the cattle rearing 
plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  preservation  of  an  open  countryside  and  of  the  species  richness  of 
omnipresent meadows. Several zones were designated as Environmentally  Sensitive Areas, ESAs, 
(Opérations Locales Agri-Environnementales, OLAE) in order to enhance both the complementary 
and the competing beef and grassland biodiversity production.  
A representative of the competing beef and biodiversity production is the ESA  Tourbières du 
Nord Cantal  (Peatlands of the North Cantal). It is constituted around valuable peatlands where the 
danger of over intensification is predominant because of the fragility of these biotopes. Several agri-
environmental agreements were proposed to farmers containing basically restrictions on fertilisation 
and  on  the  animal  density.  The  eligibility  of  parcels  for  a  particular  agreement  depends  on  their 
distance from the peatland; the constraints become more severe when approaching the peatland.  
The  ESA  Haute  Vallée  du  Mars  (High  Valley  of  Mars)  concerns  a  valley,  where  on  the 
contrary  the  grassland  biodiversity  is  jeopardised  by  abandonment  or  by  very  low  intensity  of 
agricultural  activity.  The  beef  and  biodiversity  production  are  complementary  there.  The  agri-
environmental agreements impose in this case minimal animal density requirements and demand a 
renovation of already degraded grasslands. A good representative is the agreement aiming at regaining 
heavily degraded pastures (pastures covered by more than 35 % by bushes), which asks the farmers for 
mechanical  cleaning  in  the  first  year  and  for  maintenance  by  pasture  in  the  following  years. 
Agreements are signed for 5 years.  
3.1 Model description 
Efficient frontiers can be obtained by solving the following programming model 
k
k k w V
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k w     (7) 
where  j X  is the level of activity j, aij is the input requirement coefficient of activity j for input i, bi is 
the quantity of input i at hand, cjk is the gross margin of activity j if the state of nature k occurs, FC the 
fixed cost, and  k
 
is the profit in the state of nature k. wk is the probability of the state k and  is the 
expected profit. The efficient frontier is obtained by minimising the standard deviation of the profit (1) 
by progressively increasing the minimal expected profit required by the parameter  in (5). 
In  order to  carry  out this analysis, we  applied  a simplified  version  of the Opt INRA Salers. 
Opt INRA Salers is a linear programming model constructed on the basis of the Opt INRA model
2 and 
adapted for the analysis of suckler cow farms breeding the Salers cow in the studied region. INRA has 
an experimental farm in Marcenat, on the Cézallier plateau in the Cantal region of France, which is 
home to a herd of suckler cows of the hardy Salers breed. It is an experimental site for the EU project 
FORBIOBEN
3  and  has  reliable  technical  references  on  forage  and  animals  at  one's  service. 
                                                
 
2 See a detailed description of this model in Veysset et al. (2005). 






Complementary data sources used for the parameterisation of the Opt'INRA Salers were: historical 
cases from regional farm networks (Réseaux d'Elevage Auvergne et Lozère, 2003), the opinions of 
experts from the Chamber of Agriculture of the Cantal and technical references obtained by INRA s 
proper research on the types of Salers animals and the mountain forage areas. The model was initially 
constructed as follows:   
The objective function that the program intended to maximise was the overall gross profit margin, 
in other words, the yearly products (sales and premiums) less the assignable costs (breeding costs, 
feed, fertiliser and treatment expenses, harvest costs).
4   
Animal production determines breeding activities (different stages of the life of an animal in 
relation to its diet and the production goal) and sales. The central element was the Salers suckler cow.  
It calves on February 15, can be fertilised by a bull of the Salers or Charolais breed and may or may 
not be  premium-eligible . The herd was restocked with heifers from stock in the case of pure-breed 
farms  and  with  the  purchase  of  heifers  of  different  ages  for  mixed-breed  farms.  All  of  the  sales 
categories of males and females (young, old, lean, fat, premium, non-premium) encountered at this 
time in the area studied were represented in the model.   
Animal feed was based on conserved forage (hay, bales or regrowth) in the winter and on pasture 
alone  in  the  summer  because  the  entire  utilisable  agricultural  area  (UAA)  was  constituted  by 
grassland. All of the forage was produced  on  the farm and  could  be supplemented  by  purchased 
concentrate when necessary. Rations for each animal were calculated according to its weight, its needs 
(production,  growth)  and  the  quality  of  the  forage  dispensed,  maximising  the  quantity  of  forage 
ingested. Each animal could choose between different types of rations but with the same nutritional 
value. Opt INRA Salers arbitrates between the number, the type of animal and the types of rations 
provided in order to balance needs and resources.   
The  grassland  management  system  is  relatively  complex.  Different  types  of  grasslands  were 
defined according to the farmers  practices (early mowing + grazing, late mowing + grazing, topping + 
mowing + grazing, etc.). A grassland management schedule was established and the growth and grass 
farming season was thus divided into six periods. For the purpose of this study, we considered that all 
of the hay meadows received organic fertilisation corresponding to the herd maintained during winter.  
Each type of grassland produced a specific quantity and quality of forage for each period.     
Two simplifications were applied to this model in order to make the results more transparent. 
First, in the original version the model accounts for the heterogeneity in parcels; distinction is made 
for  example  between  areas  that  can  be  used  as  hay  meadows  and  those  that  cannot  or  between 
fertilisable  and  non-fertilisable  areas.  This  heterogeneity  was  removed  from  the  model  which  is 
applied here. All the parcels are homogeneous and the model is entirely free to decide about the 
number  of  hectares  managed  in  a  particular  way.  The  second  simplification  concerns  the 
administrative framework. In the original model the pertinent CAP premiums are depicted and the 
model can choose whether or not to claim each premium, with the constraints that this implies. These 
constraints  were  likely  to  deteriorate  the  comparability  of  results  obtained,  with  the  theoretical 
framework exposed above, which does not account for them. We aggregated all the premiums in a 
single payment attributed per livestock unit. (The amount of this payment was calculated from results 
obtained with the original model for the CAP 2002 payment scheme.) 
Uncertainty  stems  from  the  volatility  of  output  prices.  Five  sets  of  prices  were  used 
corresponding to annual average output prices of the years 1998 
 
2002. Not having at hand any more 
suitable estimation of subjective probabilities, the farmers accord to these prices, we assumed that any 
of these sets of prices can occur with the same probability, 20 %. In order to analyse the impact of 
different price levels and different degrees of price variability on the environmental good production, 
the output prices were in the model defined in the following form  







                                                
 
4 For the application in this paper, the non-assignable cost was subtracted as fixed cost from the products because 






where  jk p  is the price of the output j in the state of nature k,  j p  is the expected value of the price of 
output j and  jk
 
is the deviation from the expected price in the state k. The parameter h serves to 
model an increase in the price variability without impact on the price level. 
The agreement representing the ESA  Tourbières , where the aim is to reduce the intensity of 
farming in the neighbourhood of the peatlands, is modelled by the possibility not to utilise up to 25 ha 
of the total UAA, which is 100 ha, in exchange for a per hectare agreement payment (450  /ha/year). 
The agreement applying to the ESA  Mars  is represented by the possibility to acquire up to 25 ha of 
additional grassland to the initial 100 ha. There is a unit cost attributed to the cleaning of the parcel 
(750  /ha/year during 5 years) and a payment for each hectare cleaned (300  /ha/year). The number of 
hectares eligible for both agreements is limited to cover only a part of the farm, and on one farm 
hectares eligible just for one of the two agreements can be found as they concern distinct ESAs.   
3.2 Results 
In this section the results of model simulations are presented in the form of efficient frontiers in an 
expected value 
 
standard deviation space, the number of hectares subscribed under one or another 
agreement, and farming intensity expressed as the number of livestock units (LU) per hectare.  
Figure 3 contains results for competing beef and biodiversity production. The efficient frontier 
corresponds to the concave curve. It consists of four segments, two linear ones and two concave ones. 
The segment N° 1 is linear and it emanates from the value of expected profit E( ) where the standard 
deviation V( ) is equal to zero. This point generally corresponds to the negative value of fixed cost 
and to zero agricultural activity. But in the modelled case, the farmer has the possibility to subscribe a 
part of his land under an agreement which remunerates him for not utilising it. So the highest expected 
profit attainable is equal to the negative value of fixed cost plus the number of hectares eligible for the 
agreement (25 ha) multiplied by the agreement payment. (This point is not depicted in the picture.)  
The  first  segment  is  linear  because  the  farmer  determines  once  the  optimal  structure  of  his 
activities and than he only increases the share of land in production before the limit of a fixed factor, 
here only land is considered as such, is hit. This is confirmed by the shape of the dashed curve which 
represents the farming intensity and whose value is in the first segment constant. (The value can be 
read on the secondary y-axis.) The number of hectares subscribed under the agreement is denoted z 
and corresponds to the Z-shaped curve. Its value can be read on the principal y-axis similarly as the 
expected  profit  which  is  expressed  in  1000  .  In  the  first  segment,  all  the  eligible  grassland  is 
subscribed under the agreement.    
When the grassland quantity becomes a limiting factor for further increase of the expected profit, 
adjustments in the production structure occur in order to use the land more efficiently and to save the 
agri-environmental payment for as much of the eligible land as possible. This leads to a more than 
proportionate increase in the variability of profit when the expected profit increases. The efficient 
frontier becomes concave, segment N° 2. This segment is characterised by an increasing farming 
intensity on the utilised land, and for higher levels of expected profit by a slight fall in the number of 
hectares subscribed under the agreement.   















































































The linear segment N° 3 corresponds to a progressive reduction of the grassland subscribed under 
the agreement with a constant farming intensity on the non-subscribed grassland. This segment is a 
fragment of the market opportunity line as presented in Figure 1. Its tangent cuts the y-axis at the 
value equal to the total number of hectares multiplied by the agreement payment minus the fixed cost. 
As only a part of the grassland is considered as eligible for the agreement, not the whole market line 
can be integrated in the efficient frontier but only its fragment. The Tobin s separation theorem applies 
to this part of the generated frontier. Along the segment N° 3, the farmer holds the structure of the 
portfolio of risky activities constant and he optimises the overall portfolio including environmental 
good  production  by  varying  the  proportion  of  grassland  committed  to  beef  and  biodiversity 
production, respectively.   
The last concave segment, N° 4, corresponds to the situation when no grassland is subscribed 
under the agreement. At this stage, additional expected profit can be obtained only by adjusting the 
farming system, which also actually happens as can be seen regarding the evolution of the farming 
intensity. This segment is identical to the corresponding part of an efficient frontier when no agri-
environmental agreement is proposed.  
The case of complementary beef and biodiversity production is depicted in Figure 4. The efficient 
frontier is once again composed of two linear and two concave segments but their meaning is different 
from the case above. The linear segment N° 1 emanates from the point where the standard deviation is 
equal to zero and the expected profit is equal to the negative value of fixed costs. (This point is not 
depicted  in  the  picture.)  The  reason  of  the  linearity  is  the  same  as  in  the  competing  beef  and 
biodiversity case. The linear development lasts as long as there is some free non-degraded grassland. 
In this segment no land is subscribed under the agreement aiming at regaining the degraded grassland. 
(The  curve  representing  the  number  of  hectares  subscribed  under  the  agreement  aiming  at 
complementary beef and biodiversity production has a reverse Z shape.) 
Adjustments in the farming system, which are behind the concavity of the segment N° 2,   are 
motivated by the aim to use the non-degraded grassland as efficiently as possible before proceeding to 
cleaning some additional land. The farming intensity increases in this segment and only for high levels 
of expected profit a small area of degraded grassland is subscribed under the agreement and cleaned.   
Figure 4. Portfolio optimisation with an agri-environmental agreement for complementary beef and 
biodiversity production.  
 The segment N° 3 is linear and it corresponds to a part of the market opportunity line in Figure 3. 
(Only  to a part  because the amount of degraded grassland is limited.) In accord with the Tobin s 
separation theorem, the structure of beef outputs and farming intensity are constant and the adjustment 
concerns just the extent of the beef and biodiversity production. The number of hectares subscribed 
under the agreement increases linearly. In the last segment, N° 4, all the hectares eligible are already 
subscribed.  This  segment  is  concave  because  there  is  no  further  possibility  to  acquire  additional 
grassland and the expected profit can be increased only by changing the farming system. 
The indifference curve map is to be added into the schemes generated by the model in order to 
analyse the impact of variation in policy parameters on the quantity of grassland subscribed under an 

































































preference structure, this map is sufficient to derive qualitative conclusions for analysed parameters. 
Figure 5 contains efficient frontiers generated for two different levels of agreement payments, the 
curve describing the amount of hectares involved under an agreement, and the indifference curves.    
Figure  5.  Effects  of  different  levels  of  agri-environmental  payments  on  a)  competing  and  b) 
complementary beef and biodiversity production.  
The competing production case is presented in Figure 5a. The base situation, the one exposed in 
detail in Figure 3, is drawn in light lines. (The farming intensity is for sake of clarity omitted here.) 
The tangency point between the efficient frontier and the appropriate indifference curve is the point A. 
The point A  on the Z-shaped curve corresponds to the point A on the efficient frontier. The quantity 
of biodiversity produced is zero. Increasing the agri-environmental payment, by 300  /ha here, makes 
the  efficient  frontier  flatter  for  high  levels  of  profit  and  in  the  region,  where  some  grassland  is 
subscribed under the agreement, the new efficient frontier is situated above the original one. The 
tangency point between the indifference curve and the efficient frontier is now the point B with the 
corresponding point B  on the dashed Z-shaped curve. As expected, more hectares are subscribed 
under the agreement for higher levels of agri-environmental payment. 
The  increase  of  the  agri-environmental  payment  in  the  case  of  complementary  beef  and 
biodiversity production is graphed in Figure 5b. The new efficient frontier is represented by the dashed 
curve. For higher levels of profit, the new efficient frontier is above the original one and its second 
linear segment is steeper. The initial optimum point is C. The corresponding point on the reversed Z-
shaped curve is the point C , the number of hectares subscribed under the agreement is zero. After an 
increase of the agri-environmental payment, by 300  /ha, the optimum shifts from the point C to the 
point D. The corresponding point D  on the reversed Z-shaped curve indicates that all the hectares 
eligible  for  the  agreement  are  subscribed.  Thus  increasing  the  environmental  payment  promotes 
biodiversity production.  
In section 2, we derived that increasing the agreement payment will lead to an increase (decrease) 
in the farming intensity if the beef and biodiversity production is competing (complementary). The 
simulation results confirm these propositions as can be seen in Figure 6. Figure 6a contains results in 
terms of farming intensity on the grassland not subscribed under the agreement, corresponding to the 
efficient frontiers depicted in Figure 5a. The dashed curve presents values for the increased level of 
the agreement payment. These values are higher or equal to the values corresponding to the initial 
payment level. The farming intensity values corresponding to the results in Figure 5b are reported in 
Figure 6b. Here, the farming intensity for an increased agreement payment is less or equal to the 
values under the initial payment level. 
































Figure  6.  Effects  of  different  levels  of  agri-environmental  payments  on  farming  intensity  in  the 
a) competing and b) complementary beef and biodiversity production case.   
3.3 Decoupled subsidies and uncertainty 
In what follows, comparative statics are derived for the parameters of special interest for the recent 
CAP reform analysis: level of the decoupled subsidy and of the output price variability.  
Effects  of  the  introduction  of  a  decoupled  subsidy  in  the  form  of  a  lump  sum  payment  are 
presented in Figure 9, where a lump sum payment of 5000   is accorded to the farmers. The lump sum 
payment shifts the efficient frontier upwards and the new locus is perfectly parallel to the original one. 
As  a  result,  for  a  particular  level  of  the  variability  of  the  expected  profit,  the  same  quantity  of 
grassland is subscribed under the agreement for whatever value the lump sum payment takes. This is 
true both for the case of competing as well as complementary beef and biodiversity production. As the 
slope of the efficient frontier corresponding to a particular quantity of grassland under the agreement 
is not influenced by the lump sum payment, the lump sum payment would have no effect on the 
quantity  of  grassland  put  under  the  agreement  if  the  farmer s  preference  structure  were  CARA 
(Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) because CARA indifference curves have the same slope for a 
particular variability for all levels of the utility. This is not the case under the DARA preference 
structure.    
Figure 7. Effects of different levels of a decoupled subsidy on a) competing and b) complementary 
beef and biodiversity production.  
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DARA indifference curves are getting flatter when the utility increases and so their tangency 
point with the new efficient frontier is situated to the right of the initial one, which causes the shift 
from the point A to the point B in Figure 7a and from the point C to the point D in Figure 7b. As we 
can see, introduction or an increase of the lump sum payment is not without impact on biodiversity 
production  by  DARA  farmers  under  uncertainty;  it  decreases  the  biodiversity  production  if  it  is 
competing with the beef production and increases its production if there exists a complementarity. 
For the analysis of a change in the level of uncertainty, we consider an increase of the value of the 
parameter h, from 2 to 5. In the case of competition between beef and biodiversity production, the 
indifference curves are nearly horizontal for low levels of variability and they become tangent to the 
efficient frontier in its upper part where no grassland is under the agreement, the point A  in Figure 8a. 
After an increase in the output price variability, the farmer finds it optimal to produce some positive 
level of biodiversity, the point B . He has two reasons to do so: first, the highly variable income from 
agricultural production is not excessively attractive for him and so he is more inclined to give up a 
portion of it, second, the stable income he can receive for the biodiversity production is a welcome 
possibility to stabilise the profit.  
When the beef and biodiversity production is complementary, Figure 8b, the increase in the level 
of uncertainty is harmful for biodiversity production because the cost of regaining the abandoned 
grassland  is  never  completely  covered  by  the  agreement  payment  and  it  should  be  partially 
compensated by supplementary gains from beef production. An increase in the output price variability 
makes these supplementary gains less attractive and thus not sufficient to motivate the farmer to clean 
the same number of hectares as before the increase in variability; the amount of grassland subscribed 
under  the  agreement  falls  from  the  initial  level  corresponding  to  the  point  C
 
to  the  new  level 
corresponding to the point D .   
Figure 8. Effects of different levels of output price variability on a) competing and b) complementary 
beef and biodiversity production.  
4. Discussion and conclusions 
An analytical framework was proposed which enables to analyse the willingness of a DARA risk 
averse farmer to subscribe an agri-environmental agreement when facing uncertainty in output prices. 
In  this  framework,  the  environmental  good  production  is  considered  as  a  riskless  activity.  Both 
competing  as  well  as  complementary  beef  and  biodiversity  production  is  analysed  applying 
mathematical programming farm level models of a representative suckler cow farm in the Monts du 
Cantal. However, the agri-environmental agreements modelled represent just the extreme cases where 
in the competing case some grassland should be completely diverted from beef production and in the 
complementary  one  some  completely  abandoned  grassland  is  to  be  reutilised.  In  reality,  many 
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pastures. As we dealt with the extreme cases in order to make more visible the principles of the 
proposed framework, the obtained results remain qualitative.   
We demonstrated that parcels not subscribed under an agreement aiming at lowering the farming 
intensity will be managed more intensively after an increase of the agreement payment. As such agri-
environmental agreements often request  low  farming intensity and not  lowering  of the farming 
intensity, the farmer usually  subscribes parcels where the intensity  is already  sufficiently  low for 
whatever reason, e.g. pure land quality, and not the others. While the environmental effect of such an 
agreement is zero if the farmer is risk neutral, the environmental effect is negative if the farmer is risk 
averse.  This  result  favours  whole  farm  agri-environmental  programs  which  require  that  also  the 
grassland not subscribed under specific agreements should be managed in an environment friendly 
way.     
Decoupled payments linked to properly designed cross-compliance conditions could provide this 
whole farm framework for more specific local agri-environmental measures. But they should be used 
carefully because their impact on the farmers  willingness to adopt supplementary agri-environmental 
measures will depend on the type of jointness underlying the agricultural commodities production and 
the production of particular environmental goods, and on the change in output price variability which 
is likely to accompany the decoupling process. Depending on the evolution of output price variability, 
introduction  of  a  completely  decoupled  subsidy  may  produce  3  different  outcomes  in  terms  of 
environmental good production: 1) if the introduction of decoupled subsidies will not be accompanied 
by an increase in the price variability, production of environmental goods competing with agricultural 
commodities is likely to fall but the farmer will be motivated to subscribe agreements concerning 
environmental goods complementary to agricultural commodities, 2) if the introduction of decoupled 
subsidies will be accompanied by a proportionate increase in output price variability, the willingness 
of farmers to adopt specific agreements will not change 3) if the increase in the price variability will 
be  more  than  proportionate,  the  farmer  will  be  more  willing  to  subscribe  agreements  aiming  at 
environmental  good  production  competing  with  agricultural  good  production  and  his  interest  in 
environmental good production complementary to agricultural good production will decrease,. 
All these results rely on the assumption that environmental good production represents riskless 
activity for the farmer and further developments of the model are possible in the sense of relaxation of 
this  hypothesis.  Although  we  can  consider  the  revenue  as  guaranteed,  farmer  may  perceive  as 
uncertain his effective cost of compliance with the agreements, especially if he has no experience with 
restrictions or tasks involved in an agreement. In the literature, this cost is usually  considered as 
known by the farmer. Some empirical studies on this issue would be of interest.      
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